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Immigration After DOMA: How Equal is Marriage Equality? 
John Medeiros1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Under current immigration law, there are four primary avenues 
to lawful permanent residence: family reunification, employment-
based immigration, asylum/refugee admission, and diversity based 
on country of origin.2  Of these four avenues, family reunification 
remains a top priority of our country’s legal immigration system.3  
This priority is evidenced by the disproportionate number of 
family-based visas over permanent residence visas offered through 
other means,4 and these numbers do not even account for spouses, 
parents, and minor children of United States citizens, all of whom 
are considered “immediate relatives” and, therefore, exempt from 
visa quotas.5  Since the early history of the United States, 
immigrants have arrived with their families to build better lives than 
those they left behind; this is, after all, the American Dream, the 
ideal to prosper and succeed not only for themselves but for future 
generations.  For this reason, family-based immigration has 
historically been good public policy, but only for those who fall 
within the traditional definition of family.  For others whose 
definition of family is not so traditional, such as married same-
                                                
1 Juris Doctor expected at Hamline University School of Law, May 2014. 
2 RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 32235, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY ON PERMANENT ADMISSION 1 (Dec. 20, 2010). 
3 See Reform of Legal Immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 10 (1995) (statement 
of INS Commissioner Doris Meissner praising the Clinton Administration and 
the Jordan Commission for “strongly supporting the reunification of U.S. citizens 
with their spouses and minor children as the Nation’s top priority for legal 
immigration.”). 
4 See Immigration & Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] § 201. 
5 INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i) (2013). 
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gendered couples, the picture has been very different.6 
It is estimated that nearly 36,000 United States citizens are 
currently living in the United States with foreign-born, same-sex 
partners.7  Until recently, same-gendered binational spouses have 
been unable to avail themselves of the immigration advantages 
shared by their heterosexual counterparts, largely because of 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).8  That section 
defines the term “marriage” at the federal level as “a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”9  This means that for immigration purposes, 
married same-gendered binational couples could not seek those 
benefits otherwise available to married opposite-gendered 
binational couples.  It also means that same-sex spouses of foreign 
nationals authorized to come to the United States temporarily, could 
not seek immigration benefits available to opposite-sex spouses of 
immigrants seeking the same benefit. 
This dual treatment changed, however, in the summer of 
2013, when the Supreme Court heard the case of United States v. 
Windsor,10 which challenged Section 3 of DOMA.  In Windsor, the 
Court held that by restricting the terms “marriage” and “spouse” to 
heterosexual unions only, Section 3 of DOMA violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution.11  Following the Court’s ruling, 
on July 1, 2013, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano 
released a statement that United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) would review family-based immigrant petitions 
                                                
6 See infra Section II. 
7 Gary J. Gates, Bi-National Same-Sex Unmarried Partners in Census 2000: A 
Demographic Portrait, The Williams Project on Sexual Orientation Law and 
Public Policy, UCLA School of Law (2005), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 
6kk5x4pn (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
8 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 1-3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)) 
[hereinafter DOMA]. 
9 Id. 
10 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
11 Id. 
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filed on behalf of same-sex spouses similar to how it reviews those 
same petitions filed on behalf of heterosexual spouses.12 
While many applauded Secretary Napolitano’s 
announcement, many married, same-gendered couples still fail to 
have complete redress.  This article will explain why, despite this 
recent announcement, there is still reason for married same-
gendered couples to navigate the immigration process with 
trepidation.  Section I of this article will examine how the historical 
treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
immigrants to the United States helped shape the policy of failing to 
recognize same-sex marriages pre-DOMA and helped lead to the 
passage of DOMA.  Section II will explore the immigration benefits 
of marriage and DOMA’s impact on such benefits.  Section III will 
look at the USCIS’s traditional approach to recognizing marriage 
validity, while Section IV will examine why this approach can be 
worrisome for married same-gendered couples seeking immigration 
benefits even in a post-DOMA world. 
I. HOW THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF LGBT 
IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES  HELPED SHAPE 
THE POLICY OF FAILING TO RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES PRE- DOMA AND HELPED LEAD TO THE 
PASSAGE OF DOMA 
Under its broad plenary powers, Congress has the authority 
to exclude immigrants from entering the United States.13  This 
                                                
12 Statement of Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Secretary, reported in “DHS Advises on Implementation of the Supreme Court 
DOMA Ruling,” reprinted in 90 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 1420 (July 8, 2013). 
13 While the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to regulate 
immigration, its power to do so derives from several enumerated powers.  The 
Commerce Clause states that Congress may “regulate commerce with foreign 
nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Migration Clause, also referred to as 
the Importation Clause, states that the “Migration or Importation of such Persons 
as any of the States now existing shall think proper to permit, shall not be 
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and 
 Immigration After DOMA 199 
plenary power is so broad it cannot be questioned by the courts.14  
For example, in one of the most famous cases to illustrate 
Congress’s plenary power in the context of immigration law, the 
Supreme Court held in Chae Chan Ping v. United States that the 
power to exclude is a proposition that is “not open to 
controversy.”15  Congress’s broad plenary power has had a direct 
impact on LGBT immigrants seeking entry into the United States.  
In order to understand Congress’s historical treatment of LGBT 
immigrants, one must look at the general history of immigration-
related exclusions, since such exclusions gave rise to public 
sentiment against undesirables, which has traditionally included 
LGBT immigrants. 
A. How the Historical Treatment of LGBT 
Immigrants to the United States Helped Shape 
the Policy of Failing to Recognize Same-Sex 
Marriages pre-DOMA 
Even before homosexuality was targeted as a ground of 
exclusion, the prohibition against LGBT immigrants before that 
time served as part of a larger scheme to exclude undesirables, 
which one historian refers to as ensuring “a ‘proper’ sexual and 
gender order.”16  While the Alien Act of June 25, 1798 allowed the 
                                                
eight,” implying that Congress may permit migration after 1808.  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  The Naturalization Clause authorizes Congress to “establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 4.  The War Clause 
grants Congress the power to declare war.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 11.  As 
Justice Daniel concedes in his dissent in the Passenger Cases, the War Clause 
means that “Congress can place in the condition of alien enemies all who are 
under allegiance to a nation in open war with the United States.” Smith v. Turner, 
48 U.S. 283, 182 (1849). 
14 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 456 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Because 
only Congress has the power to set the requirements for acquisition of citizenship 
by persons not born within the territory of the United States, federal courts cannot 
exercise that power under the guise of their remedial authority.”). 
15 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). 
16 EITHNE LUIBHEID & LIONEL CANTU JR., QUEER MIGRATIONS: SEXUALITY, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP, AND BORDER CROSSINGS xiv (2005). 
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President to deport any foreign-born national whom he considered 
“dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,”17 the first 
truly restrictive federal immigration law was passed on March 3, 
1875.  Named after its sponsor, Horace Page, the Page Act excluded 
immigrants considered “undesirable.”18  Over a hundred years later, 
the government would admit that the Page Act established “the 
policy of direct federal regulation of immigration by prohibiting for 
the first time the entry of undesirable immigrants.”19  Out of 
growing concern of a booming prostitution industry that developed 
after male Chinese immigrants came to America during the 
California gold rush of 1848, Congress passed the Act, which 
specifically excluded contract laborers, criminal convicts (except 
those convicted of political offenses) and Asian women “imported 
for the purposes of prostitution.”20 
Seven years later, Congress passed the Immigration Law of 
1882.  Undesirables under that law included anyone deemed to be a 
“convict, lunatic, idiot, or any [other] person unable to take care of 
himself or herself without becoming a public charge.”21  This was 
followed less than ten years later by the Immigration Act of 1891, 
which excluded any immigrant who was “suffering from a 
loathsome or a contagious disease,” polygamists, paupers, and 
anyone convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.22  The significance 
of these provisions would later reappear when those living with 
AIDS started coming to the United States; such immigrants would 
                                                
17 Alien and Sedition Acts, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798). 
18 Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration 
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 708 (2005) (referring to the Page Act as the 
“Page Law.” The terms are used interchangeably). 
19 Eithne Luibheid, A Blueprint for Exclusion: The Page Law, Prostitution, and 
Discrimination against Chinese Women, in ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING 
SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 31 (2002) (citing U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1991, A1-2). 
20 Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477. 
21 Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214. 
22 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
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be deemed excludable, primarily on health-related grounds and 
public charge grounds.23 
The 1891 Act is the first time the term “crime of moral 
turpitude” appears in immigration law; it is a term that remains in 
effect today.  There is no statutory definition of “moral turpitude,” 
which leaves the decision as to whether an offense involves moral 
turpitude completely within the discretion of the immigration 
authorities and the courts.24  Courts have held that the term “refers 
generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, 
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed 
between persons or society in general.”25 
The next significant piece of immigration legislation was 
passed in 1903.  Under that Act, among those who were excludable 
were epileptics, beggars, and political extremists (such as 
anarchists);26 this Act later gave rise to the Immigration Act of 
1917, which was legislation that was passed during World War I 
that contained a comprehensive list of immigration exclusions, 
many of which remain law today.  This Act specifically excludes 
the following immigrants, inter alia: 
All idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, 
epileptics, insane persons; persons who have had one 
or more attacks of insanity at any time previously; 
persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority; 
persons with chronic alcoholism; paupers . . . 
persons afflicted with tuberculosis in any form or 
                                                
23 Bettina M. Fernandez, HIV Exclusion of Immigrants Under the Immigration 
Reform & Control Act of 1986, 5 LA RAZA L.J. 65, 85 (1992) (“The INS seemed 
to treat immigrants who are ‘likely to become a public charge,’ a category of 
immigrants who are not allowed waivers, and immigrants infected with HIV as 
being in the same category: persons who are not likely to be able to support 
themselves in the event of legalization.”). 
24 Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. 
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
771, 785 (1993). 
25 See Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994) (citing Matter of 
Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (BIA 1988); Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 
225, 227 (BIA 1980)). 
26 Immigration Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 569. 
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with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease; 
persons not comprehended within any of the 
foregoing excluded class who are found to be and 
are certified by the examining surgeon as being 
mentally or physically defective, such as physical 
defect being of a nature which may affect the ability 
of such alien to earn a living; persons who have been 
convicted of or admit having committed a felony or 
other crime or misdemeanor involving moral 
turpitude; polygamists, or persons who practice 
polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice of 
polygamy; anarchists, or persons who believe in or 
advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the 
Government of the United States. . . prostitutes, or 
persons coming into the United States for the 
purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral 
purpose . . . contract laborers . . . persons likely to 
become a public charge . . .”27 
By this time, immigration laws excluded both immoral 
women and men entering for immoral purposes.  Immorality 
encompassed a host of sexual behaviors, including cohabitation 
sexual relations outside of marriage28 and, arguably, sodomy. 
But the legislation that would have the biggest impact on the 
admission – or, rather, the exclusion – of homosexuals to the United 
States is the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.  Enacted despite a 
presidential veto, the Immigration Act of 1952 (which would serve 
as the basis of what is known today as the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, or the “INA”) heightened anti-immigrant sentiment 
by “legislating the most dramatic expansion of the grounds for 
exclusion in the nation’s history.”29  Among those excluded under 
the Act were those who violated narcotics laws, persons entering 
the country to engage in immoral sexual acts, addicts, Communists 
                                                
27 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875–76. 
28 LUIBHEID & CANTU, supra note 16, at xv. 
29 See Minter, supra note 24, at 776. 
 Immigration After DOMA 203 
and homosexuals.30  What made this Act so powerful was its scope.  
Although the initial draft of the Act specifically listed 
“homosexuals and sex perverts” as an excludable class, that 
language was removed by the recommendation of the Public Health 
Service, which advised Congress that the term “psychopathic 
personality” was broad enough to include both homosexuality and 
sexual perversion.31  As a result, the Act was amended to exclude 
“[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a 
mental defect.”32  It was agreed that this language would 
supposedly make the diagnosis of covert homosexuals easier.33  Not 
only did the Act bar the entry of homosexuals on “psychopathic 
personality” grounds, but it required that permanent residents 
applying for naturalization show they were persons of “good moral 
character.”34  In practice, this meant that lawful permanent residents 
applying for naturalization who identified themselves as 
homosexual would be considered persons suffering from a 
“psychopathic personality,” and therefore ineligible for 
naturalization for failing to satisfy the “good moral character” 
requirement.35 
                                                
30 INA § 212(a), Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 162, 18 (repealed 1990) (listing 
grounds of exclusion). 
31 See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 345 (1950) (recommending that the category of 
“mental defectives” under the 1917 Act be amended to include “homosexuals and 
sex perverts.”).  See also S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 9 (1952) (“[t]he Public Health 
Service has advised that the provision for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with 
psychopathic personality or a mental defect which appears in the instant bill is 
sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex 
perverts.”). 
32 INA § 212(a)(4) (repealed 1990). 
33 See Minter, supra note 24, at 777 (noting that the PHS reasoned that this 
general language included homosexuals, and that “in those instances in which the 
disturbance in sexuality may be difficult to uncover, a more obvious disturbance 
in personality may be encountered which would warrant a classification of 
psychopathic personality or mental defect” as reported in Report of the Public 
Health Service on the Medical Aspect of H.R. 2379, H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 
46-47 (1952)). 
34 INA § 316(a). 
35 Logan Bushell, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses” – 
Just as Long as They Fit the Heteronormative Ideal: U.S. Immigration Law’s 
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In 1962, Congress was struck a blow when the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled in the case of Fleuti v. Rosenberg that the 
term “psychopathic personality” was unconstitutionally vague when 
applied to homosexuals.36  In response, Congress amended the INA 
to specifically include the words “sexual deviate.”  Its reason for 
doing so was clear; it did so to “serve the purpose of resolving any 
doubt on this point.”37  Two years later, the issue would come up 
again before the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, but instead of 
reaffirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fleuti, the Court ruled 
that the term “psychopathic personality” was clearly intended to 
include immigrants who were homosexual.38  The Boutilier case 
would become one of our country’s most devastating examples of 
the harsh realities of exclusion laws against homosexual 
immigrants.39 
                                                
Exclusionary & Inequitable Treatment of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgendered, and Queer Migrants, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 673, 682 (2013) (citing 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 35 (1999) (quoting Immigration Service, Annual Report at 132 (1909))). 
36 See Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 654-56 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated, 374 
U.S. 449 (1963).  George Fleuti, a lawful permanent resident from Switzerland, 
was ordered deported on the grounds that he originally entered the United States 
as a homosexual and, therefore, was a person inflicted with a “psychopathic 
personality.”  The 9th Circuit held that “psychopathic personality” was 
unconstitutionally vague, and invalidated Fleuti’s deportation order, stating, 
“[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the statutory term ‘psychopathic 
personality,’ when measured by common understanding and practices, does not 
convey sufficiently definite warning that homosexuality and sex perversion are 
embraced therein.”  Id. at 658. 
37 Hill v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 
1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 19 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 16 
(1965)). 
38 See Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) 
(quoting, “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a 
doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include 
homosexuals such as petitioner.”). 
39 After the Court’s decision to deport him back to Canada, Clive Boutilier 
attempted suicide, resulting in permanent brain damage, and his parents were 
forced to leave the United States to take care of their son for the next twenty 
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 B.  How the Historical Treatment of 
Homosexuals in the United States Helped Lead 
to the Passage of DOMA 
With the language of the law firmly on its side, the 
government would continue to apply the term “psychopathic 
personality” for the purposes of excluding homosexuals from 
entering the United States for the next twenty-five years, until the 
Immigration Act of 1990 officially removed sexual orientation from 
the list of immigration exclusions.40  Yet it was only eight years 
after the Boutilier decision that the first same-sex marriage case, 
Adams v. Howerton, was filed with Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS, the former name of the USCIS).41  Unlike all 
immigration cases before it involving homosexuality, the Adams 
case asked something very different of the INS and of the federal 
courts.  It asked not only that homosexuality be validated, but also 
that homosexual relationships be recognized as equal to 
heterosexual relationships.  This was a place the immigration 
authorities and the federal courts were not willing to go.  Needless 
to say, the INS denied the case swiftly and harshly.42  Going even 
further, the Appellate Court stated the following in its decision: 
“Congress has determined that preferential status is 
not warranted for the spouses of homosexual 
                                                
years.  See Bushell, supra note 35, at 685 (quoting Marc Stein, Forgetting and 
Remembering a Deported Alien, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, http://hnn.us/articles/ 
1769.html). 
40 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978 
[hereinafter Immigration Act of 1990] (eliminating earlier laws that allowed the 
Immigration Service to exclude immigrants based on sexual orientation). 
41 Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). 
42 In one of the most famous examples of the Immigration Service’s harsh 
treatment toward homosexual couples, the legal reason offered by the 
Immigration Service for the denial of the petition filed by a U.S. citizen on behalf 
of his foreign-born same sex spouse was that the petition had “failed to establish 
that a bona fide marital relationship can exist between two faggots.” See Letter 
from the Immigration & Naturalization Service to Richard Adams (Nov. 24, 
1975), in JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND 
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 221 (New York, Basic Books, 2001). 
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marriages.  Perhaps this is because homosexual 
marriages never produce offspring, because they are 
not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or 
because they violate traditional and often prevailing 
societal mores.  In any event, having found that 
Congress rationally intended to deny preferential 
status to the spouses of such marriages, we need not 
further ‘probe and test the justifications for the 
legislative decision.’”43 
In issuing its scathing decision, the Adams Court went far 
beyond making a decision based on the grounds of exclusion and 
instead attempted to provide a federal definition of marriage based 
on federal public policy long before DOMA became the law of the 
land.44 
The year 1990 saw the beginning of what appeared to be a 
much more favorable treatment of homosexual immigrants.  It was 
then that Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990.45  Only by 
reading the congressional reports does one get to see the way that 
this policy change came about: 
The term “sexual deviation” (INA 212(a)(4)) was 
included with the other mental health exclusion 
grounds expressly for the purpose of excluding 
homosexuals.  Not only is this provision out of step 
with current notions of privacy and personal dignity, 
it is also inconsistent with contemporary psychiatric 
theories . . . To put an end to this unfairness, 
                                                
43 Adams, 673 F.2d. at 1042-43. 
44 Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their 
Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 537, 591-92 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the Adams court . . . 
ventured on into uncharted territory, relying on the INS’s examination of marital 
bona fides under the INA to demonstrate that Congress meant to create a new 
federal definition of “marriage” for immigration purposes in the INA beyond “the 
mere validity of a marriage under state law.”). 
45 Immigration Act of 1990. 
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Congress must repeal the “sexual deviation” ground 
[for immigration exclusion].46 
Despite the fact that the American Psychiatric Association 
declared in 1973 that homosexuality was no longer a psychiatric 
disorder,47 Congress continued to maintain the homosexuality ban 
for nearly twenty years.48  Nevertheless, while many homosexuals 
and immigrant rights advocates welcomed the tardy news, the 
“good moral character” ground of exclusion was not removed from 
the list immigration exclusions and still remains a requirement for 
legal permanent residence to this day.49  As one historian notes, 
“[a]lthough homosexuals may no longer be explicitly excluded on 
sexuality grounds, their sexuality still makes them liable to be 
constructed as lacking good moral character or otherwise ineligible 
for permanent residence and citizenship.”50  While the Immigration 
Act of 1990 was a step toward recognizing the legitimacy of 
homosexuality, it was a far cry from recognizing the validity of 
homosexual relationships, which is a different matter entirely.  
What the shift in law meant was that homosexuals could achieve 
the permanent residence previously denied them, as long as they 
appeared to be persons of good moral character (i.e., still hiding 
their homosexuality but for a different reason), and as long as their 
permanent residence was not based on marriage to a spouse of the 
same gender. 
In an ironic twist of fate, the same year that Congress 
removed homosexuality from the list of immigration exclusions, 
three same-sex couples in Hawaii applied for marriage licenses and 
all were denied because of their sexual orientation.51  The couples 
sued, arguing that the Hawaii’s marriage statute violated their 
                                                
46 H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, at 56 (1990). 
47 John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, 
Incorporated, for the Year 1974: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of 
Representatives, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 30, 620-651 (1975), 
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/discrimination.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
48 See Immigration Act of 1990. 
49 INA § 101(f). 
50 LUIBHEID & CANTU, supra note 16, at xiv. 
51 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48-52 (Haw. 1993). 
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constitutional right of equal protection under the law.52  The Hawaii 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the couples.53  The decision caught 
the public by storm, and many members of Congress grew 
concerned that gay marriage would sweep across the states, and that 
federal benefits would have to be extended to same-sex married 
couples.54  Homosexuality was one thing, after all, but sanctioning 
homosexual relationships posed a very new threat, and Congress 
became afraid.  This fear was compounded by the belief that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution would force states 
that did not recognize same-sex marriages to do so if such 
marriages were legally performed elsewhere.55  It was precisely this 
fear that led to the passage of DOMA.56  With its surprising scarcity 
of words, DOMA had two important provisions.  The first affirmed 
that no state shall be required to recognize same sex marriages 
lawfully performed in other states.57  The second sealed the 
                                                
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 48, ¶¶ 23, 24 (quoting, “Sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal 
protection analysis under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution,” and 
“HRS § 572-1 [the statute defining marriage] is therefore subject to the ‘strict 
scrutiny’ test.  HRS § 572-1 is presumed to be unconstitutional unless it can be 
shown that the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state 
interests and that it is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of 
constitutional rights.”). 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2906. 
55 Id. at 7-10. 
56 Id. at 2 (quoting as the need for DOMA, “[I]f Hawaii (or some other State) 
recognizes same-sex ‘marriages,’ other States that do not permit homosexuals to 
marry would be confronted with the complicated issue of whether they are 
nonetheless obligated under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution to give binding legal effect to such unions. With regard to federal 
law, a decision by one State to authorize same-sex ‘marriage’ would raise the 
issue of whether such couples are entitled to federal benefits that depend on 
marital status. H.R. 3396 anticipates these complicated questions by laying down 
clear rules to guide their resolution, and it does so in a manner that preserves each 
State’s ability to decide the underlying policy issue however it chooses.”). 
57 DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (“[N]o State . . . 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
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definition of marriage at the federal level as a union solely between 
one man and one woman.58  In the context of immigration law, this 
legislation would prove detrimental. 
II. THE IMMIGRATION BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE AND 
DOMA’S IMPACT ON SUCH BENEFITS 
When posed with the question of why it is important for the 
government to recognize the validity of marriages, the first response 
that comes to the minds of most people is that recognition leads to 
permanent residence for foreign-born spouses of United States 
citizens and lawful permanent residents.  While this conclusion is 
certainly true, immigration benefits extend even further, 
encompassing both those wishing to come to the United States 
permanently as well as those seeking to enter on a temporary basis. 
A.  DOMA’s Impact on Immigrants 
An “immigrant” is a person who seeks to enter the United 
States permanently.59  Under current law, most foreign-born 
nationals immigrate to the United States on the basis of family 
reunification.60  While United States immigration law is a quota-
based system, the primary category of persons exempt from the 
quota is that of spouses of United States citizens (referred to by the 
law as “immediate relatives”).61  Those who are subject to 
numerical limits include spouses of lawful permanent residents, 
                                                
any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that 
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”). 
58 Id. § 3(a) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the world ‘marriage’ means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”). 
59 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (9th ed. 2009). 
60 Titshaw, supra note 44, at 546. 
61 INA § 201(b)(2).  The term “immediate relative” also encompasses children of 
U.S. citizens and parents of U.S. citizens if their U.S. citizen child is at least 
twenty-one years old. 
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spouses who are derivatives of primary beneficiaries of 
employment-based visa petitions, and spouses of applicants selected 
under the diversity visa program.62  For these individuals eligibility 
for lawful permanent residence in the United States is dependent 
upon the recognition of their marriage. 
Section 3 of DOMA defines marriage as solely between one 
man and one woman for the purposes of federal benefits.63  Unlike 
DOMA, the INA’s definitions of “spouse” and “marriage” do not 
address same-sex relationships, despite the fact that Congress 
redrafted and amended the INA over a hundred times in the 
statute’s history.64  This would suggest that Congress intended to 
leave the terms undefined in the INA.  Nevertheless, prior to the 
Windsor decision, the definition sealed by DOMA prevented same-
sex spouses of United States citizens and lawful permanent 
residents to be recognized as beneficiaries of their spouses’ 
petitions, even though they were lawfully married in a jurisdiction 
that recognized their marriage. 
B. DOMA’s Impact on Nonimmigrants 
Marriage recognition also determines eligibility for a host of 
immigration benefits spanning well beyond the approval of spousal 
petitions for permanent residence.65  For example, foreign-born 
nationals coming to the United States on a temporary basis are 
referred to as “nonimmigrants,”66 and the law makes nonimmigrant 
                                                
62 The annual quota for spouses and unmarried children of lawful permanent 
residents ranges from 226,000 to 480,000. INA § 201(c).  This far exceeds the 
annual quota of 140,000 for those seeking to immigrate through the employment-
based visa categories. INA § 201(d). It is also at least four times the annual quota 
of 55,000 for those seeking to immigrate through the diversity visa program.  
INA § 201(e). 
63 DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
64 Jessica Portmess, Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of 
the Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration After Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1825, 1845 (2012). 
65 See generally INA § 101(a)(15) (listing the various types of nonimmigrant, or 
temporary, visas). 
66 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 48 (under adjustment of status). 
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visas available to their recognized spouses.  There are a myriad of 
spousal nonimmigrant visa categories under the INA, all require 
marriage recognition.  These categories include the following: 
spouse of an ambassador and other diplomat;67 the spouse of a 
nonimmigrant treaty trader or investor;68 the spouse of a foreign 
student pursuing a degree;69 the spouse of a representative of a 
recognized foreign government to an international organization;70 
the spouse of a temporary professional worker;71 the spouse of a 
journalist or other representative of foreign informational media;72 
the spouse of an exchange visitor or foreign medical graduate;73 the 
fiancé(e) of a United States citizen;74 the spouse of an intra-
company transferee (manager, executive, or individual with 
specialized knowledge);75 the spouse of a vocational or 
nonacademic student;76 the spouse of a representative of a member 
state of NATO;77 the spouse of an individual with extraordinary 
ability in the arts, sciences, business, or athletics;78 the spouse of an 
internationally recognized artist or entertainer;79 the spouse of a 
participant in an international cultural exchange program;80 the 
spouse of a minister or religious worker;81 the spouse of an 
informant who supplies critical information related to a crime;82 the 
spouse of a person who is a victim of severe trafficking in 
                                                
67 INA § 101(a)(15)(A). 
68 INA § 101(a)(15)(E). 
69 INA § 101(a)(15)(F). 
70 INA § 101(a)(15)(G). 
71 INA § 101(a)(15)(H). 
72 INA § 101(a)(15)(I). 
73 INA § 101(a)(15)(J). 
74 INA § 101(a)(15)(K). 
75 INA § 101(a)(15)(L). 
76 INA § 101(a)(15)(M). 
77 INA § 101(a)(15)(N). 
78 INA § 101(a)(15)(O). 
79 INA § 101(a)(15)(P). 
80 INA § 101(a)(15)(Q). 
81 INA § 101(a)(15)(R). 
82 INA § 101(a)(15)(S). 
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persons;83 the spouse of a victim of criminal activity;84 and the 
spouse of a permanent resident awaiting availability of a permanent 
resident visa.85  Qualifying foreign-born nationals whose marriages 
are recognized by the United States may have their spouses 
accompany them in any of the categories listed above for the 
duration of their length of admission.  Furthermore, with many of 
the spousal nonimmigrant categories, the recognized spouse is 
authorized to work in the United States.86  In the nonimmigrant 
context, marriage recognition is essential for a person to be eligible 
to accompany his or her spouse to the United States instead of being 
separated for years. 
Prior to the Windsor decision that struck down Section 3 of 
DOMA, there were thirteen countries in the world that recognized 
same-sex marriage.87  Additionally, Mexico had regional provisions 
that allowed same-sex couples to marry, and still does to this day.88  
One often unreported impact of DOMA on immigration benefits 
concerns foreign-born nationals lawfully married in one of these 
countries, yet whose same-sex spouses were ineligible for entry in 
the nonimmigrant visa categories mentioned above, despite the 
lawful recognition of their marriage abroad.  As a matter of public 
policy, these categories are essential to the United States 
maintaining professional, international, and diplomatic relations by 
increasing global interaction and trade.  Nevertheless, 
nonimmigrants married to same-sex spouses have had to choose 
between coming to the United States and leaving their spouses 
behind for what could amount to years, or abandoning the 
                                                
83 INA § 101(a)(15)(T). 
84 INA § 101(a)(15)(U). 
85 INA § 101(a)(15)(V). 
86 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2011) (listing the classes of aliens 
authorized to work in the United States). 
87 These countries included Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, 
Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Argentina, Denmark, France, and Brazil.  
The Freedom to Marry Internationally, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/international (last visited Sept. 
2, 2013).  Since the Windsor decision, Uruguay, New Zealand, and Great Britain 
have been added to that list.  Id. 
88 Id. 
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opportunity to work or study in the United States altogether. 
C. The Repeal of Section 3 of DOMA 
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held in Windsor that 
Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.89  Immediately following 
the Court’s ruling the federal government responded.  First 
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano released a 
statement directing USCIS to review immigrant visa petitions filed 
on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on 
behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.90  That statement was followed up 
with the Secretary’s answers to Frequently Asked Questions, 
among which confirmed that the ruling also meant that United 
States citizens could file nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of 
foreign-born fiancés/fiancées; permanent residents who are the 
same-sex spouse of a United States citizen would be eligible for 
expedited naturalization; and waivers formerly reserved only for 
opposite-sex spouses of United States citizens or lawful permanent 
residents would be eligible for same-sex spouses as well.91  Shortly 
thereafter the Board of Immigration Appeals held that, in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision, Section 3 of DOMA is no longer “an 
impediment to the recognition of lawful same-sex marriages and 
spouses if the marriage is valid under the laws of the State where it 
was celebrated.”92  This was followed by United States Secretary of 
State John Kerry’s cable providing guidance to embassies around 
the world on how to issue immigrant and nonimmigrant visas 
involving same-sex couples.93 
                                                
89 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
90 Statement of Janet Napolitano, supra note 12. 
91 Statement of Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Secretary, reported in “Same-Sex Marriages,” reprinted in 90 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES at 1611 (Aug. 5, 2013). 
92 Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158, 159 (BIA 2013). 
93 Cable of John Kerry, “Next Step on DOMA: Guidance for Posts,” D.O.S. 
Mem. 00112850 (Aug. 13, 2013), http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ 
Next_Steps_On_DOMA_Guidance_For_Posts_August_2013.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2013). 
214 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
Despite the administration’s swift change in policy and the 
Court’s ruling, two side effects of DOMA remain.  The first is the 
creation of statutes that define marriage as solely between one man 
and one woman.  The second is the related phenomenon of state 
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriages.  
Twenty-five states have both passed legislation and amended their 
constitutions to ban same-sex marriage.94  An additional four states 
have passed legislation without amending their constitutions,95 
while four others have amended their constitutions without passing 
legislation.96  This matters in the immigration context because, 
although the federal government has exclusive control over United 
States immigration law, policy, regulation, and enforcement,97 
states often play a role in the immigration process. 98 
III. THE USCIS’S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO 
RECOGNIZING MARRIAGE VALIDITY  
In deciding Adams v. Howerton, the Ninth Circuit 
established a two-prong test to determine the validity of a 
marriage.99  Under the Adams test, the Court reasoned that the 
marriage must first be valid under state law.100  If it is, then an 
analysis must be done to determine that the marriage is also valid 
                                                
94 These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  State Level Marriage 
Equality, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA, http://www.marriageequality.org/sites/ 
default/files/National%20Map%20%2318%20%2819-Dec-2013%29.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
95 These states include Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id. 
96 These states include Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon.  Id. 
97 See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) 
(superseded by statute as stated in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)). 
98 See infra Section III. 
99 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038. 
100 Id. 
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under the INA.101  In practice, however, the Ninth Circuit’s test is 
problematic for two reasons.  First, the INA does not define the 
word “spouse.”102  Second, the test is too general to be applicable in 
all situations.  For example, the first prong of the test fails because 
it does not take into account marriages performed in other 
countries, nor does it acknowledge that a marriage recognized in 
one state may not be recognized in another.103  The second prong is 
also flawed because it takes the position that federal law determines 
marital status, which is exactly what the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional when it rendered its decision in Windsor.104  In 
Adams, the Court looked to other sections of the immigration 
statute that had nothing to do with marriage –specifically, the 
homosexuality ground of exclusion – and reasoned that, because 
Congress excluded homosexuals from entering the United States, a 
marriage involving homosexuals could not possibly be valid under 
the INA.105  Such a decision is not possible today, since 
homosexuality is no longer a ground for exclusion. 
Although Adams has not been overruled, it should not 
control in determining marriage validity.106  Twenty years after the 
Adams decision, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of marriage 
                                                
101 Id. 
102 In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 748 (BIA 2005). 
103 Titshaw, supra note 44, at 597. 
104 Ironically, prior to DOMA, a federal court found that the BIA did not act 
rationally by relying exclusively on state law to define marriage when it upheld 
the denial of an application for cancellation of deportation of a Canadian-born 
applicant who claimed to be a common law spouse even though California did 
not recognize common law marriages.  Kahn v. INS, 20 F.3d 960, 962 (9th Cir. 
1994).  In his dissent, Judge Kozinski expressed outrage at the notion of a 
national definition for marriage (quoting “[b]y purporting to establish a federal 
law of domestic relations, the majority boldly goes where no federal court has 
gone before.”).  Id. at 967. 
105 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040-41 (“We think it unlikely that Congress intended to 
give homosexual spouses preferential admission treatment under section 201(b) 
of the Act when, in the very same amendments adding that section, it mandated 
their exclusion.”). 
106 Titshaw, supra note 44, at 595-96. 
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validity in Agyeman v. INS.107  In a footnote the Court set forth a 
more reasonable three-prong approach.108  It ruled that for a 
marriage to confer immigration benefits, it must be legally valid at 
the place of celebration; be bona fide; and not violate public 
policy.109  This position is consistent with the approach followed by 
the USICS when adjudicating petitions.110 
A. Marriage Must Be Valid at the Place of 
Celebration 
The first prong of the test referenced in the Agyeman 
decision reinforces the general rule that a marriage will be 
recognized if it was “entered into in accordance with the laws of the 
place where the marriage took place.”111  This statutory language is 
also supported by case law.112 
                                                
107 Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2002). 
108 Id. at 879 n.2. See also Titshaw, supra note 44, at 550. 
109 Id. 
110 See Adjudicators’ Field Manual ch. 21.3(a)(2)(B) (“As a general rule, the 
validity of a marriage is judged by the law of the place of celebration. If the 
marriage is voidable but no court action to void the marriage has taken place, it 
will be considered valid for immigration purposes. However, if a marriage is 
valid in the country where celebrated but considered offensive to public policy of 
the United States, it will not be recognized as valid for immigration purposes. 
Plural marriages fall within this category.”). 
111 INA § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
112 See U.S. v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 268 (“The general rule is that the validity of 
a marriage is determined by the law of the state where it took place.”).  See also 
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 223 (1934); Matter of Gamero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 
674 (BIA 1974); Matter of Levine, 13 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of 
Luna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 385 (BIA 1983); Matter of Bautista, 16 I. & N. Dec. 602 
(BIA 1978); Matter of Arenas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 174 (BIA 1975); Matter of P-, 4 I. 
& N. Dec. 610 (BIA, Acting A.G. 1952); Matter of Ma, 15 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 
1974) (Where one of the parties to a marriage has a prior divorce, the court will 
look to the law of the state where the subsequent marriage was celebrated to 
determine whether or not that state would recognize the validity of the divorce). 
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B. Marriage Must Be Bona Fide 
The second prong of the test requires that the marriage be 
bona fide.  A marriage is not bona fide if the parties do not intend to 
live together as husband and wife and therefore are not recognized 
for immigration purposes.113  Evidence to establish the bona fides 
of a marriage can include proof that the beneficiary has been listed 
as the petitioner’s spouse on insurance policies, property leases, 
income tax forms, or bank accounts; as well as testimony or other 
evidence regarding courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence 
and experiences.114 
                                                
113 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040.  See also Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (“A marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to 
establish a life together at the time they were married.”); Lutwak v. United States, 
344 S. Ct. 604, 611 (1953) (“Congress did not intend to provide aliens with an 
easy means of circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in which 
neither of the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship; that 
petitioners so believed is evidenced by their care in concealing from the 
immigration authorities that the ostensible husbands and wives were to separate 
immediately after their entry into this country and were never to live together as 
husband and wife. The common understanding of a marriage, which Congress 
must have had in mind when it made provision for ‘alien spouses' in the War 
Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken to establish a life together and 
assume certain duties and obligations.”); Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 
(BIA 1983) (“A marriage entered into for the primary purpose of circumventing 
the immigration laws, commonly referred to as a fraudulent or sham marriage, is 
not recognized for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.”). 
114 See Matter of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385, 387 (BIA 1975).  See also Matter 
of Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 1, 1 (BIA 1983) (“In determining whether a marriage is fraudulent for 
immigration purposes, the conduct of the parties after the marriage is relevant as 
to their intent at the time of marriage; evidence to establish intent may take many 
forms, including, but not limited to, proof that the beneficiary has been listed as 
the petitioner's spouse on insurance policies, property leases, income tax forms, 
or bank accounts; and testimony or other evidence regarding courtship, wedding 
ceremony, shared residence and experiences.”); Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 882-83 
(“Evidence of the marriage's bona fides may include: jointly-filed tax returns; 
shared bank accounts or credit cards; insurance policies covering both spouses; 
property leases or mortgages in both names; documents reflecting joint 
ownership of a car or other property; medical records showing the other spouse as 
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C. Marriage Must Not Violate Public Policy 
The final prong of the three part test requires that the 
marriage not violate public policy.115  There are two types of public 
policy considerations when it comes to marriage in the immigration 
context: federal public policy, and state public policy. 
One accomplishment of the now-defunct Section 3 of 
DOMA allowed the USCIS to deny petitions filed by United States 
citizens and permanent residents on behalf of their lawful same-sex 
spouses on the grounds that the marriage violated federal public 
policy, since federal law defined marriage as solely between one 
man and one woman.116  But even before DOMA was around to 
accomplish this goal, the courts have long held that federal public 
policy is a consideration when determining marriage validity, and 
that a marriage in violation of federal public policy is not a valid 
marriage.117  One such example of marriage that is a violation of 
                                                
the person to contact; telephone bills showing frequent communication between 
the spouses; and testimony or other evidence regarding the couple's courtship, 
wedding ceremony, honeymoon, correspondences, and shared experiences.”). 
115 See Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 801-802 (9th Cir. 2002) (“An exception to 
the general rule, however, is ordinarily made in the case of marriages repugnant 
to the public policy of the domicile of the parties, in respect of polygamy, incest, 
or miscegenation, or otherwise contrary to its positive laws.”).  See also Matter of 
H, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641 (BIA 1962) (“An exception to the general rule, 
however, is ordinarily made in the case of marriages repugnant to the public 
policy of the domicile of the parties, in respect to polygamy, incest, or 
miscegenation, or otherwise contrary to its positive laws. Such cases involve 
marriages which are repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of the parties 
or to the laws of nature as generally recognized in Christian countries.”). 
116 DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
117 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“[F]rom the earliest 
history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society.”).  
See also In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 753 (BIA 2005) (reversing the 
denial of a petition filed by a transgender U.S. citizen on behalf of her foreign-
born spouse, ruling that the decision was based on an interpretation of INA 
201(b) and not by finding a general federal public policy against the recognition 
of such marriages). 
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federal public policy is plural marriages.118  Another is fraudulent 
marriages. 
Although the general rule is that a marriage that is valid 
where it was celebrated is valid everywhere, principles of conflict 
of laws allow for an exception if the marriage violates the “strong 
public policy” of another state.119  Many state courts have failed to 
recognize the validity of a marriage performed elsewhere on the 
grounds that the marriage violated that state’s public policy where 
couples are domiciled in that state.120  On occasion, the federal 
courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have also 
recognized these exceptions for immigration purposes.121  
Typically, these cases have fallen into three main categories: (1) 
marriages between biracial spouses; (2) marriages between those 
who are related by blood, and (3) marriages involving a spouse who 
has not yet reached that state’s age of consent. 
There have been two BIA cases questioning the validity of 
marriages between biracial spouses in the context of immigration 
benefits.122  In the 1949 case of Matter of D –, the BIA failed to 
recognize the validity of a marriage between a Norwegian-born 
immigrant and his United States citizen wife of African descent 
because the two were married in Canada for the purpose of 
circumventing the anti-miscegenation laws of North Dakota, which 
made it a crime for African-Americans and whites to cohabit or to 
get married in that state.123  In this case the Court found no violation 
of federal public policy, but a strong violation of state public policy.  
                                                
118 See Matter of Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308 (BIA 1973) (dismissing an 
appeal of a petition previously denied on the ground that plural marriages offend 
the public policy of the United States, even though the petitioner’s second 
marriage may be valid under Jordanian law). 
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). See also 
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Florida is not 
required to recognize or apply Massachusetts’ same-sex marriage law because it 
clearly conflicts with Florida’s legitimate public policy of opposing same-sex 
marriage.”); Portmess, supra note 64, at 1846. 
120 Titshaw, supra note 44, at 565. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Matter of D –, 3 I. & N. Dec. 480, 481-82 (BIA 1949). 
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The second case concerning the validity of mixed racial marriage in 
the immigration context involved a Filipino man who was married 
in Washington, D.C.124  In that case the BIA recognized the validity 
of the marriage to the detriment of the petitioner, who was later 
found to be of bad moral character because of an adulterous 
relationship with the woman he later married.  The petitioner 
argued that his first marriage was not valid because, after marrying 
in Washington, D.C., the couple moved to Maryland, which had a 
criminal statute against marriage between a “white person . . . and a 
member of the Malay race.”125  But because the state did not have a 
criminal cohabitation statute, the Court ruled that the marriage was 
not in violation of state public policy and was therefore valid.126  As 
with Matter of D –, for immigration purposes, the violation of state 
public policy was not determined by the biracial marriage as much 
as it was determined by violation of a criminal statute of the state of 
domicile. 
Marriages of consanguinity traditionally involve marriages 
between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, and cousins.  In the 
immigration context, such marriages are considered valid if they do 
not violate the strong public policy expressed in the criminal statute 
of the couple’s state of domicile.127  The BIA has held that where a 
state has a criminal statute against consanguinity or against 
cohabitation of spouses who evade the state’s laws by marrying in 
another state that recognizes marriages of consanguinity, the 
marriage will not be valid for immigration purposes.128 
                                                
124 Matter of C –, 7 I. & N. Dec. 768 (BIA 1956). 
125 Id. at 110. 
126 Id. at 113. 
127 Matter of T –, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (BIA 1960) (“It is to be noted that 
Congress has not expressed any public policy excluding a spouse on the ground 
of consanguinity and that immigration laws are silent on this point; recourse must 
be had to state law for expressions of such public policy.”).  See also Titshaw, 
supra note 44, at 569. 
128 Matter of Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1967) (refusing to recognize a 
marriage between first cousins in South Carolina because the couple was 
domiciled in Wisconsin, where such marriages were void and subject to criminal 
sanctions).  See also Angelo Bartolomeo, Department of Justice Not Defending 
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Concerning marriages involving a spouse that has not yet 
reached the age of consent, the BIA takes a similar position as it 
does with marriages of consanguinity: if the marriage is recognized 
in both the state of celebration and the state of domicile, it will be 
recognized by the BIA.129  For example, in Matter of Agoudemos, 
the BIA held that the marriage of a sixteen year old girl was valid 
for immigration purposes because she was of the age of consent for 
both the state where the marriage was celebrated and the state 
where the couple was domiciled.130 
The state public policy cases, referenced above, all have a 
common thread: the test used to determine if the marriage violated 
state public policy was whether or not the state of domicile had a 
criminal statute forbidding the marriage, and if the parties to the 
marriage violated that statute.  Given the logic of the Agoudemos 
Court, if same-sex marriages violated a criminal statute, such 
marriages would arguably violate the state public policy. 
IV.  WHY THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO 
MARRIAGE VALIDITY CAN BE WORRISOME FOR 
 MARRIED SAME-GENDERED COUPLES SEEKING 
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS IN A POST- DOMA WORLD 
On July 8, 2013, Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet 
Napolitano, stated that family-based immigrant petitions filed on 
behalf of same-sex spouses would be reviewed in the same manner 
as those petitions filed on behalf of heterosexual spouses.131  Since 
issuing that statement, the USCIS has provided guidance to same-
gendered binational couples on how to apply for immigration 
benefits through marriage.132  In adjudicating such petitions, the 
                                                
the Defense of Marriage Act: Politically Significant, Legally Irrelevant?, 62 
DEPAUL L. REV. 857, 861 (2013). 
129 See Matter of Agoudemos, 10 I. & N. Dec. 444, 445-46 (BIA 1964). 
130 Id. 
131 Statement by Janet Napolitano, supra note 12. 
132 USCIS, Same Sex Marriages, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ 
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USCIS should follow the three-prong approach to marriage validity 
described in Part III,  in lieu of the two-prong approach referenced 
in Adams.  Yet even with the more favorable three-prong test, those 
seeking immigration benefits under this analysis would be best 
advised to proceed with caution.  To understand why such caution 
is warranted, it is worth considering how each prong of the test 
could be applied to married same-gendered couples seeking 
immigration benefits. 
 
A. Same-Sex Marriages Must Be Valid at the Place 
of Celebration 
The first requirement is that the marriage must be valid in 
the place of celebration.  This is true with marriage in all 
immigration cases, and same-sex marriages should not be treated 
any differently.  If same-sex marriage is recognized in the foreign 
country, or state, where it took place, then this should satisfy the 
first prong of the test.  However, many states and countries 
recognize civil unions, but not same-sex marriage.  The USCIS 
does not recognize civil unions for immigration purposes. 
B. Same Sex Marriage Must Be Bona Fide 
For a marriage to be bona fide, it means it must be made in 
good faith, and without fraud or deceit.133  For married, same-
gendered couples, this may be challenging.  It is not uncommon for 
same-sex couples to include a person who was previously married 
to someone of the opposite gender, and there are many valid 
reasons why this might be.  Perhaps that person is bisexual, or was 
married before becoming aware of his/her own sexual orientation, 
or did not fully accept their orientation, or perhaps that person was 
                                                
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2543215c310af310
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100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
133 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 199. 
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drawn to marriage by strong religious beliefs.  In many countries, 
including some where homosexuality is illegal, arranged marriages 
are common and carry social status for the individuals.  In such 
countries, it would go against cultural and societal norms for 
individuals to not marry.  Given this reality, married same-gendered 
couples should be cautious of an immigration officer who could 
conclude that either the prior marriage was fraudulent, or the 
current marriage is fraudulent.  In either case, the situation is likely 
to raise the bar in proving the bona fides of the marriage. 
On a related note, homosexuals from countries that 
criminalize homosexual activity should be cautious when answering 
questions related to criminal grounds of exclusion.  For example, 
one question asks, “[ha]ve you EVER, in or outside the United 
States . . . knowingly committed any crime of moral turpitude . . . 
for which you have not been arrested?”134  Although sexual 
orientation has been taken off the list of immigration exclusions, 
criminal activity has not. 
C. Same Sex Marriage Must Not Violate Public 
Policy 
In determining if same sex marriage violates public policy, 
we first look to federal public policy arguments and then to state 
public policy arguments. 
Federal public policy objections to heterosexual marriage 
have traditionally been rare.135  The same is not true, however, for 
same-sex marriages.136  For seventeen years, from 1996 until the 
June 2013, Section 3 of DOMA provided a federal public policy 
objection to same-sex marriage.  But even with the repeal of 
Section 3, there are still federal public policy concerns that must be 
taken into consideration when determining the validity of same-sex 
                                                
134 USCIS Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust 
Status, 3, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
135 Titshaw, supra note 44, at 602. 
136 See DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 1-3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).  See also 
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marriage for immigration purposes.  To fully understand these 
concerns, it helps to look at what the Supreme Court decided in 
Windsor. 
In Windsor the Court did not rule that the federal 
government must recognize all same-sex marriages; it ruled only 
that Section 3 of DOMA, which provides a federal definition for 
marriage, is unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution.137  Despite its ruling, the Court upheld 
Congress’s power to enact federal laws that bear on marital rights to 
further federal public policy.  Consider the following statement 
from the opinion: 
By history and tradition the definition and regulation 
of marriage, as will be discussed in more detail, has 
been treated as being within the authority and realm 
of the separate States. Yet it is further established 
that Congress, in enacting discrete statutes, can make 
determinations that bear on marital rights and 
privileges. Just this Term the Court upheld the 
authority of the Congress to pre-empt state laws, 
allowing a former spouse to retain life insurance 
proceeds under a federal program that gave her 
priority, because of formal beneficiary designation 
rules, over the wife by a second marriage who 
survived the husband . . . This is one example of the 
general principle that when the Federal Government 
acts in the exercise of its own proper authority, it has 
a wide choice of the mechanisms and means to adopt 
. . . Congress has the power both to ensure efficiency 
in the administration of its programs and to choose 
what larger goals and policies to pursue.  Other 
precedents involving congressional statutes which 
affect marriages and family status further illustrate 
this point. In addressing the interaction of state 
domestic relations and federal immigration law 
Congress determined that marriages “entered into for 
                                                
137 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
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the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the 
United States] as an immigrant” will not qualify the 
noncitizen for that status, even if the noncitizen’s 
marriage is valid and proper for state-law purposes. . 
. And in establishing income-based criteria for Social 
Security benefits, Congress decided that although 
state law would determine in general who qualifies 
as an applicant’s spouse, common-law marriages 
also should be recognized, regardless of any 
particular State’s view on these relationships.138 
Even though the Court recognized the “dignity” of marriage 
equality,139 it did not prohibit a federal regulation of marriage in 
certain circumstances.  Instead, it ruled there are examples that 
“establish the constitutionality of limited federal laws that regulate 
the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy.” 140  The 
problem with DOMA was that it had simply gone beyond its reach 
of what was acceptable.141  Furthermore, although the Court did not 
address Congress’s specific authority to regulate immigration 
benefits for same-sex spouses, it did use the INA as an example of 
permissible congressional statutes that affect marriages to illustrate 
the notion that Congress has the power to “ensure efficiency in the 
administration of its programs and to choose what larger goals and 
policies to pursue.”142  This wording suggests that a future 
Congressional attempt to define marriage in certain contexts, 
including immigration, would not necessarily be deemed 
unconstitutional. 
Even more curious is the language at the very end of the 
Windsor decision.  Justice Kennedy writes that DOMA injures, 
“those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”143  When read in the context of 
immigration law, this language takes on special meaning because 
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226 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
states that recognize same sex marriage cannot possibly “protect” 
same-gendered binational spouses who wish to seek immigration 
benefits, as immigration is a federal question and one under the 
exclusive control of Congress.  Such a reading lends support to a 
Congressional definition of marriage for immigration purposes. 
As for state public policy objections, there is much more 
need to exercise caution.  The Windsor decision left intact Section 2 
of DOMA, which says no state shall be required to give effect to 
same-sex marriages recognized in other states.144  In other words, 
Section 2 of DOMA still allows states to “formulate their own 
public policy regarding the legal recognition of same sex unions, 
free from any federal constitutional implications.”145  But in many 
ways Section 2 of DOMA is redundant, since states have always 
had the ability to choose their own laws over competing laws of 
another state – provided the choice is neither arbitrary nor unfair – 
because full faith and credit was never intended to compel states to 
recognize marriages performed in other states.146  When a state 
chooses to recognize the marriage laws of another state, it does so 
under the principle of comity – respect for actions of other states.  
But comity is a common law principle, and not a constitutional 
mandate, and despite this principle, states maintain the ability to 
object to those marriages they strongly oppose.147  Common 
exceptions to the principle of comity are “natural law exceptions,” 
which include marriages that are considered universally offensive, 
such as polygamous and incestuous marriages; and “positive law 
exceptions,” which include marriages that are prohibited by the 
legislature, including those marriages by that state’s own residents 
who were married in another jurisdiction for the sole purpose of 
                                                
144 DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
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evading their state’s marriage restriction laws.148  Same-sex 
marriage, which is not recognized by all fifty states, proves that 
these exceptions to the common law principle of comity are still 
alive today. 
Even though these exceptions to comity would still exist 
despite Section 2 of DOMA, this does not mean that Section 2 does 
not serve a purpose.  Section 2 adds a new section to the Full Faith 
and Credit Act that specifically provides that states need not grant 
full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in other states 
that may choose to celebrate them.149  Since the enactment of 
DOMA, nearly sixty percent (60%) of states have passed “mini-
DOMAs” – statutes and constitutional amendments banning the 
celebration and/or the recognition of same-sex marriages.150  It is 
these “mini-DOMAs” that could be problematic for same-gendered 
binational spouses seeking immigration benefits. 
i .   State Statutes Banning Same-Sex Marriage 
At the risk of oversimplifying the legislative process, 
citizens of a state elect their legislators, and those legislators make 
and pass the laws in the interest of those citizens.  This is how 
thirty-one states have successfully passed statutes banning same-sex 
marriage.151  But what is unclear is what those statutes have to say 
in order to express a sufficiently strong public policy.  We know 
that when the BIA has refused to recognize marriage on state public 
policy grounds, those marriages violated criminal laws of the state 
of domicile.152  This would suggest, as one scholar has noted, that 
since the Supreme Court has held that sexual intimacy and 
cohabitation cannot be constitutionally criminalized, no state could 
enforce a same-sex criminal statute that rises to the “standard 
traditionally required to express a sufficiently strong state public 
                                                
148 Id. at 161-62. 
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policy.”153 But such an argument presumes that only criminal 
statutes determine public policy, and this is not true.  Perhaps the 
best example to illustrate this is that of common-law marriage, 
since common-law marriage, like same-sex marriage, is recognized 
in some states, but not in others, and those states that prohibit it 
have no criminal statutes against it. 
A common-law marriage is defined as “one that takes legal 
effect without license or ceremony.”154  Common-law marriages 
have four main elements: capacity to enter into the contract of 
marriage, agreement to that contract, cohabitation, and holding 
out.155  Of these, the most important element is holding out. 156  
Common-law marriage can only be established if the couple hold 
themselves out to themselves and to others as a married couple.157  
The number of states where common law marriages can be 
contracted has substantially reduced over the years, and currently 
only nine states and the District of Columbia allow common law 
marriages to be contracted within its borders.158 
In the case of common-law marriage, the public policy 
concern is not whether the act violates a criminal statute, but if the 
marriage is declared void by that state.  Void marriages do not 
comport with legal requirements; they are invalid at inception, and, 
unlike voidable marriages, cannot be made valid.159  State courts 
have held that void marriages violate public policy, and some have 
used common-law marriages to illustrate that point.  In the case of 
Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
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that common-law marriages, which are not subject to criminal 
statutes but are void in Minnesota, cannot be consummated by 
Minnesota residents who visit another state that allows common-
law marriages.160  The Court held that the obvious implication is 
that marriages declared void by a state legislature “demonstrate a 
strong public policy.”161  The Court emphasized that its opinion was 
based on the fact that common-law marriages in Minnesota are 
“void, not merely prohibited.”162 
The principle that a common-law marriage considered by a 
state to be void violates that state’s public policy has also been 
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.  In the case of 
Meister v. Moore, the Court held that “in the absence of any 
provision declaring marriages not celebrated in a prescribed manner 
. . . absolutely void, it is held that all marriages regularly made 
according to the common law are valid and binding.”163  Because 
the Supreme Court has recognized that void provisions under state 
law are permissible, same-sex marriages would arguably violate the 
public policy of those states with such provisions in their statutes.  
Meister is still good law, and federal courts have since had a long 
history of deferring to state law for marital status determinations, 
even when there is inconsistency among states as to what 
constitutes a marriage.164 
When it comes to determining eligibility for immigration 
benefits, the same principle applies.  Common-law marriages 
recognized in the state where celebrated will be accepted for 
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immigration purposes.165  However, whereas voidable marriages are 
recognized only if there is not a court order declaring the marriage 
void,166 void marriages are not marriages, and, therefore, not valid 
for immigration purposes.167  In adjudicating immigration petitions, 
examiners refer to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual, which describes 
itself as a “comprehensive ‘how to’ manual detailing policies and 
procedures for all aspects of the Adjudications Program.”168  The 
manual reinforces the notion that if a marriage is voidable, but not 
void, it will be considered valid for immigration purposes.169  
Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Manual, which sets forth the basic 
organizational directives of the United States Department of State, 
including procedures to follow when issuing visas abroad, offers the 
same guidance to consulate officers.170  Following this line of 
reasoning, the BIA has refused to recognize a marriage that is void 
in the state of domicile even if it was recognized in the state where 
it was celebrated.171 
The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the state 
public policy concern for marriage recognition for immigration 
benefits is not solely based on whether the marriage in question 
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violates a criminal statute, but also takes into consideration whether 
the marriage is declared void – and not merely prohibited – by the 
domicile state.  Applying that principle to same-sex marriage, there 
is a state public policy argument that needs to be considered.  Of the 
thirty-one states that have passed legislation banning same-sex 
marriage, nearly half of them specifically state in their statutes that 
same-sex marriages are “void.”172  In addition, twelve states have 
language in their statutes that specifically say that same-sex 
marriage violates that state’s public policy.173  With such language, 
there is the possibility that the USCIS or the BIA could reverse 
from its current position to hold that same-sex marriages that are 
recognized in the location where they are celebrated, but void by 
law in the state of domicile, are not valid for immigration purposes 
because such marriages violate the public policy of the domicile 
state. 
ii .   State Constitutions Banning Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Even more problematic for same-gendered spouses seeking 
immigration benefits are those states that have amended their 
constitutions to prohibit recognition of same-sex marriages, since 
amending the constitution is arguably the strongest way for states to 
formulate their own public policy.  One of the main functions of a 
state’s constitution, after all, is to “create the state’s ‘organic law’; 
that is, specifying the general, fundamental law to which the state’s 
statutes must conform.”174  If citizens are unhappy with the content 
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of their state’s constitution, they can change it, and if they do not 
change it, one can only assume they accept it as it stands.175 
While the process of amending a state’s constitution varies 
by state,176 the people of the state speak through the political or 
electoral process of their state to address constitutional amendments 
they desire.177  State constitutional amendments demonstrate a very 
strong public policy, as they prevent a state supreme court from 
imposing its policy preferences on the people of that state.178  There 
are currently twenty-nine states that have amended their 
constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage.179  States with 
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage have a 
strong public policy argument for two reasons: passionate debates 
and public referenda were a part of the process to pass the 
amendments, and states have no other permissible options to 
express their opposition to same-sex relationships.180  Such 
constitutional amendments are the “most extreme public policy 
objection constitutionally possible.”181 
Constitutional amendments pose a unique problem when it 
comes to a state’s public policy for refusing to recognize same-sex 
marriage because the right of people to govern themselves is a 
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principal element of freedom, and this includes the right of the 
states’ citizens to define marriage as they see fit, even if those 
citizens are wrong.  As Justice Black stated, “[t]he people, through 
their elected representatives, may of course be wrong in making 
those determinations, but the right of self-government that our 
Constitution preserves is just as important as any of the specific 
individual freedoms preserved in the Bill of Rights.”182 
Obviously, constitutional amendments banning same sex-
marriage create tension between the sovereignty of the people and 
the rights of a given minority, and it is precisely this tension on 
which the USCIS or the BIA could rely to deny immigration 
benefits, on public policy grounds, to same-gendered spouses who 
reside in a state whose constitution prevents the state from 
recognizing their marriage. 
It is worth emphasizing that the current position of the 
USCIS is to recognize such marriages despite the public policy of 
the domicile state.  But the USCIS’s position itself is one that is 
problematic.  When posed with the question of whether or not the 
Service will recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully performed in 
the state of celebration, but prohibited by the domicile state, the 
Service currently offers the following response: 
Yes. As a general matter, the law of the place where 
the marriage was celebrated determines whether the 
marriage is legally valid for immigration purposes. 
Just as USCIS applies all relevant laws to determine 
the validity of an opposite-sex marriage, we will 
apply all relevant laws to determine the validity of a 
same-sex marriage.The domicile state’s laws and 
policies on same-sex marriages will not bear on 
whether USCIS will recognize a marriage as 
valid. [emphasis added]183 
But this response is markedly different from the response 
that initially appeared on the Service’s website.  The initial 
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response posted immediately following the Windsor decision read 
as follows: 
Yes, you can file the petition.  In evaluating the 
petition, as a general matter, USCIS looks to the law 
of the place where the marriage took place when 
determining whether it is valid for immigration law 
purposes.  That general rule is subject to some 
limited exceptions under which federal immigration 
agencies historically have considered the law of the 
state of residence in addition to the law of the state 
of celebration of the marriage.  Whether those 
exceptions apply may depend on individual, fact-
specific circumstances.  If necessary, we may need 
to provide further guidance on this question going 
forward.184 
From the USCIS’s most recent statement, it appears as 
though the agency has determined that state public policy 
objections no longer apply in determining marriage validity, 
regardless of whether or not the marriage is a same-sex marriage or 
an opposite-sex marriage.  But such a position is inconsistent with 
case law and with the agency’s own internal procedures, as stated in 
government policy manuals such as the Adjudicator’s Field 
Manual185 and the United States Department of State Foreign 
Affairs Manual.186  If anything, the Service’s shift in stance 
illustrates the fragility of the state public policy prong.  The agency 
changed its response through a Question & Answer comment 
posted on its web page, and not by using solid foundational 
administrative law principles.  In adapting this policy the USCIS 
has arguably dismissed prior case law and administrative law 
principles of rulemaking, making itself susceptible to litigation that 
could bring state public policy arguments back in the foreground. 
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iii .   Solutions to State Statutes and State 
Constitutions Banning Same-Sex 
Marriage 
As “mini-DOMAs” pose the most solid arguments in favor 
of a state public policy strong enough to allow the refusal of 
recognition of same-sex marriages for immigration purposes, it is 
imperative for supporters of same-sex marriage to find a lasting 
solution to prevent the USCIS or the BIA from taking this position. 
One solution would be a court challenge in which the 
Supreme Court determines that sexual orientation is a suspect class 
that warrants heightened scrutiny under constitutional analysis.  As 
it stands, despite the Windsor decision, sexual orientation, unlike 
racial discrimination, has not been made a suspect class and, 
consequently, does not undergo the same level of scrutiny when 
used as a basis for discrimination.187  Defining marriage to exclude 
same-sex spouses is, arguably, a form of gender discrimination, and 
gender discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny.188  The Court 
could even go so far as to declare sexual orientation an immutable 
characteristic, in turn ruling that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation renders even higher scrutiny.  Either ruling would 
invalidate statutes that prohibit same-sex marriage, and would 
declare unconstitutional those amendments that define marriage as 
only between one man and one woman because they violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  While the United States Supreme Court 
has ruled that state constitutional amendments that discriminate 
against LGBT members of society are unconstitutional violations of 
equal protection, it has not ruled that sexual orientation is a 
protected class that calls for a heightened level of review.  For 
example, in Romer v. Evans, the Court held that an amendment to 
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Colorado’s constitution that prohibited the state or local 
government from adopting measures that would protect 
homosexuals was a classification undertaken for its own sake and, 
therefore, a violation of equal protection.189  But the Romer Court 
made its decision using a rational basis review, and a similar ruling 
in cases concerning statutes or amendments that define marriage – 
something traditionally left to the states – remains uncertain. 
Another solution would be a fundamental right challenge.  A 
fundamental right is a “right derived from natural or fundamental 
law.”190  It is a “significant component of liberty, encroachments of 
which are rigorously tested by courts to ascertain the soundness of 
purported governmental justifications.”191 Fundamental right 
challenges warrant strict scrutiny to determine whether the law 
violates the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Strict 
scrutiny is the most stringent standard applied by the courts under 
judicial review, and favors an individual’s fundamental right over 
the governmental regulation suppressing that right.  To pass strict 
scrutiny, the government must have a compelling interest, establish 
law that is narrowly tailored to that interest, and use the least 
restrictive means to achieve that goal.  Since 1888, the United 
States Supreme Court has held fourteen times that marriage is a 
fundamental right of all people, and the deprivation of that right 
warrants strict scrutiny,192 but it has yet to apply that rule to 
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sense.”). 
190 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 744. 
191 Id. 
192 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (marriage is “the most 
important relation in life.”); Meyer v. Nebrasksa, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the 
right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a central part of liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 
(1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
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marriage among same sex couples.  It came close to doing so in 
rendering its decision in Lawrence v. Texas, when the Court issued 
the following statement, “our laws and tradition afford 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and education [. . 
.]. Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for 
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”193  But Lawrence 
was not a case questioning the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage; it was a case questioning anti-sodomy laws.  
Nevertheless, it could lend support to a constitutional challenge to 
state statutes and state constitutions that ban same sex marriage. 
Regrettably, when given the chance to make either of these 
determinations, the Windsor Court fell short, missing its 
                                                
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (ruling that marriage is fundamental to existence and survival); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971) (“[M]arriage involves 
interests of basic importance to our society” and is “a fundamental human 
relationship.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) 
(“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 499 (1977) (“[W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family 
living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the 
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the 
challenged regulation.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 
(1977) (“[I]t is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make 
without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to 
marriage . . . .”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to 
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental right.”); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 
102, 116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of 
children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic 
importance in our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“our laws and tradition afford 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and education.”). 
193 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 774. 
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opportunity to strike down the many state laws and constitutions 
that continue to impose the traditional limits of marriage.194 
CONCLUSION 
Under the United States Constitution, Congress’s plenary 
power grants almost total control over immigration.  While many 
applaud the decision of the USCIS to recognize the validity of 
same-sex marriages in granting immigration benefits, there is 
nothing to prevent Congress from imposing limits on same-sex 
marriage for immigration purposes, and nothing to prevent the 
USCIS from shifting its position in the future.  Furthermore, despite 
the repeal of Section 3 of DOMA, there is no uniform rule 
recognizing all same sex marriages under the INA.  Same-sex 
marriage should continue to be recognized for immigration 
purposes provided they pass the three prong test; first, they must be 
recognized in the place of celebration; second, they must be bona 
fide; and third, they must not violate federal or public policy.  
Under the current fragile system, same-sex marriages run the risk of 
a heightened bar in proving they are bona fide.  They also run the 
risk of being considered a violation of public policy where domicile 
states have passed legislation making such marriages void and 
invalid, or have amended their constitutions to prohibit the 
recognition of such marriages.  For these reasons one of three things 
must happen: (1) Congress must amend the INA to specifically 
recognize the validity of same-sex marriages despite state public 
policy objections; (2) the federal courts must recognize same-sex 
marriages despite these similar objections; or (3) the Supreme Court 
must rule either that sexual orientation is a protected status 
deserving of heightened scrutiny, or that the fundamental right to 
marriage applies to same-sex couples, and deserves a strict scrutiny 
level of review.  With either of these two rulings, the Supreme 
Court would invalidate state constitutional amendments banning 
same-sex marriages and, in turn, weaken state public policy 
                                                
194 See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 Immigration After DOMA 239 
arguments against the recognition of same-sex marriages for 
immigration purposes. 
 
